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REDEFINING THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE IN THE GLOBAL
AGE: RECONCILING MEDELLÍN WITH ORIGINAL INTENT
Sarah Elizabeth Nokes*
INTRODUCTION
If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in
respect to other nations.
—James Madison1
One of the most fundamental and intuitive principles of international law is that
states must be able to contract meaningfully with one another.  The founders of this
nation had that principle in mind when they drafted the Supremacy Clause into Article
VI of the Constitution, which states that treaties are the “supreme Law of the Land.”2 
The Supreme Court has read caveats into the Supremacy Clause throughout the nation’s
history, but no change to the Clause’s apparent meaning and interpretation was greater
than the recent ruling in Medellín v. Texas.3  The ruling, which seems on its face to
have overturned the plain language of the Clause, does constitute a change in the
way we view international treaties and obligations.  However, it is not a divergence
from the founders’ original intent.4  This apparent discrepancy is true because the
nature of international agreements has so drastically changed since the time of the
founding that nothing short of a new interpretation of the Supremacy Clause could
reconcile the Framers’ original intent with the modern landscape of treaties.  Foreign
relations have changed in the past two hundred years, and the law must keep pace with
these changes or risk becoming inconsistent and obsolete.5
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2011; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 2008. I
would like to thank my family and friends for their constant love and support.
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 302 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
2 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 1, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[A
treaty’s] objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which have the force of law, but derive
it from the obligations of good faith.”).
3 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
4 See id. at 562 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority in Medellín ignored the
Framers’ original intent in crafting their opinion).
5 See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, STARE DECISIS 30 (1949) (“[I]t is—in law and in other
fields too—that men continue to chant of the immutability of a rule in order to ‘cover up the
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When the Framers of the Constitution wrote the Supremacy Clause into Article VI,
they did not intend for Congress to have to legislate on treaty content in order for it
to become the “supreme Law of the Land.”6  However, the Supreme Court’s recent
holding in Medellín that such implementing legislation is necessary, and indeed that
there is a presumption against the self-execution of treaties today,7 is consistent with
the Framers’ original intent, even if it was beyond their contemporary understanding.8 
To believe otherwise in modern times,9 where international agreements and treaties deal
with the essential rights of persons and parties, and not solely with the diplomacy of
nations, would be to allow international tribunals to say what American law is, and to
endanger the fundamental rights—especially the unenumerated rights of the Ninth
Amendment10—of American citizens without their voice or consent.
This Note will argue that the majority opinion in Medellín v. Texas is not incon-
sistent with the intent of the Framers of the Constitution.  This Note will first discuss
the Supremacy Clause in context of its creation, including the original intent of the
clause and the international agreements of the day to which it referred.  It will also
discuss the history of the case law and related rules which led the Court to its pre-
Medellín interpretation of treaty self-execution.  Next, this Note will discuss all three
(majority, concurring, and dissenting) opinions in the Medellín case.  This Note will
then discuss the nature of international agreements and treaties in the modern day, with
a focus on how they are different than international agreements at the time of the
founding.  In order to illustrate these modern treaty differences, this Note will discuss
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.  This treaty will also be
used to illustrate the possible consequences of the strict originalist interpretation of
transformation, to deny the reality of change, to conceal the truth of adaptation behind a verbal
disguise of fixity and universality.’ But the more blunt, open, and direct course is truer to demo-
cratic traditions.” (internal citations omitted)).
6 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 541–44 (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, at 277 (1796)
(Iredell, J.)) (“Under this Constitution therefore, so far as a treaty constitutionally is binding, upon
principles of moral obligation, it is also by the vigour [sic] of its own authority to be executed
in fact. It would not otherwise be the Supreme law in the new sense provided for . . . .”).
7 John T. Parry, Rewriting the Roberts Court’s Law of Treaties, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO
65, 69 (2010), http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/seealso/vol88/pdf/88TexasLRev
SeeAlso65.pdf; see Medellín, 552 U.S. at 544–45.
8 For the argument that Medellín represents a departure from original intent, see D. A.
Jeremy Telman, Medellín and Originalism, 68 MD. L. REV. 377, 380–83 (2009).
9 By “modern times” the author is referring to the post-World War II period, which has been
characterized by the explosion of international cooperation, human rights treaties, and super-
sovereign bodies. See Roza Pati, Rights and Their Limits: The Constitution for Europe in Intern-
ational and Comparative Legal Perspective, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 223, 242 (2005). 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The distinction of Ninth Amendment rights is important because
there is no worry that a treaty which is in direct contradiction with the enumerated rights held
by citizens under the Constitution will be upheld to the detriment of those rights because the
Constitution is also the “supreme Law of the Land” and that which is not constitutional will
not be enforced by the courts. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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treaty implementation.  Finally, this Note will cursorily discuss the possible effects that
the Medellín holding will have on treaty interpretation, foreign policy, and the ways in
which foreign nations contract with the United States.
I. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE IN CONTEXT
A. Traditional International Agreements
There is ample evidence that the treaties contemplated by the founders when they
wrote the Supremacy Clause looked vastly different than the agreements negotiated
by American diplomats today.  The corpus of what the founders understood as treaties
would have been shaped by their knowledge of treaties negotiated by western European
sovereigns during the eighteenth century, and by their own experiences with treaty
negotiations under the Articles of Confederation.  In the period governed by the Articles
of Confederation (1777–1787), the confederation of states was responsible for negoti-
ating ten treaties with foreign nations.11  In the decade following the ratification of the
Constitution, the newly created United States contracted with foreign nations a total of
six times.12  These sixteen treaties dealt with alliances, peace, war, and trade relations
and were the treaties with which the Framers of the Constitution would likely have been
most familiar.13
It follows that when the Framers drafted the Supremacy Clause into Article VI of
the Constitution, they considered these kinds of treaties and this type of diplomacy. 
Treaties of the day dealt with war and peace and commercial relations.  The private
rights of citizens were largely unaffected.14  While citizens had to abide by these treaties
11 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Morocco, Jan. 1787, 8 Stat. 100; Treaty of Amity
and Commerce, U.S.-Prussia, July 9–Sep. 10, 1785, 8 Stat. 84; Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-
Gr. Brit., Sep. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Swed., Apr. 3, 1783,
8 Stat. 60; Armistice, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 20, 1783, 8 Stat. 58; Provisional Articles, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,
Nov. 30, 1782, 8 Stat. 54; Convention Concerning Vessels Recaptured, U.S.-Neth., Oct. 8, 1782,
8 Stat. 50; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Neth., Oct. 8, 1782, 8 Stat. 32; Treaty of Amity
and Commerce, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 12; Treaty of Alliance, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6, 1778, 8
Stat. 6. For the purposes of this Note, treaties with Native American nations are not considered.
12 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Tunis, Aug. 28, 1797, 8 Stat. 157; Treaty of Peace
and Friendship, U.S.-Tripoli, Nov. 4, 1796, 8 Stat. 154; Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navi-
gation, U.S.-Spain, Oct. 27, 1795, 8 Stat. 138; Treaty of Peace and Amity, U.S.-Alg., Sep. 5,
1795, 8 Stat. 133; Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794,
8 Stat. 116; Convention on Consular Relations, U.S.-Fr., Nov. 14, 1788, 8 Stat. 106.
13 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 1, at 98 (John Jay).
14 This is true as a general rule, particularly in comparison to what we think of as “human
rights” in the modern day. However, some treaties of the time conferred rights upon individuals
as a secondary result of the rights negotiated by nations. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199, 199–200 (1796) (requiring the defendant to pay debt owed to British citizens, regardless
of a Virginia state statute to the contrary); SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING
AND ENFORCEMENT 33 (2d ed. 1916).
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and agreements, their own fundamental, individual rights were not jeopardized (nor
enhanced) by international diplomacy.15  As John Yoo has stated, “International affairs
and domestic affairs occupied fairly separate spheres, and international agreements
rarely regulated private activity, which was the preserve of domestic lawmaking.”16 
Similarly, treaties of the period did not usually give rise to rights which enabled citizens
to bring individual causes of action against a government based solely upon the lan-
guage of the international agreement.17  These were the treaties and agreements which
the Framers of the Constitution envisioned becoming the supreme law of the land.
B. Original Intent
The Supremacy Clause, in Article VI of the Constitution, may be divided into two
parts.  The first part establishes that federal law is supreme compared to the laws of
the several states.18  The second part declares that treaties entered into by the United
States are also supreme over the laws of the states.19  This Note will focus on the second
of these two parts.  The history of the treaty power reveals the original intent of the
Supremacy Clause.
The origins of the federal government’s treaty-making power—and indeed, the
Supremacy Clause—date back to the pre-Revolutionary period.  They were expressed
in the Declaration of Independence itself.20  The Articles of Confederation placed the
power to create treaties in the hands of the federal government to the exclusion of the
several states.21  However, though the power to treat with foreign nations was given
solely to the Continental Congress, the federal government did not have an enforcement
mechanism against the states to ensure that the individual states’ laws complied with
15 David C. Bolstad, Note, Combating Torture: Revitalizing the Toscanino Exception to
the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, 13 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 871, 902 (1991).
16 John Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original
Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1967 (1999).
17 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 253 (1829), overruled in part by United
States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
18 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
19 Id.
20 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776) (“That these United
Colonies are . . . Free and Independent States; . . . [and] they have full Power to levy War, con-
clude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and do all other Acts and Things which
Independent States may of right do.”).
21 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. IX, para. 1 (“The United States . . . shall
have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, . . . [and] entering
into treaties and alliances . . . .”); id. para. 1 (“No State, without the consent of the United States
in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into
any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty with any King, Prince or State . . . .”); id. art. VI,
para. 3 (“No State shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations
in treaties, entered into by the United States in Congress assembled, with any King, Prince
or State . . . .”).
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American commitments abroad.22  Thus the states often flaunted treaty provisions and
failed to enforce treaties against their citizens.23  Because of the lack of enforcement
provision as against the states,24 Congress could do little more than beg them to comply
with the country’s contracted international obligations.25  It was clear to many of the
Framers that if the United States were to succeed as a nation, it would have to give the
federal government leave to create treaties and to enforce them.26  As Supreme Court
Justice Joseph Story asserted, “The peace of the nation, and its good faith, and moral
dignity, indispensable require, that all state laws should be subjected to [the] supremacy
[of treaties].”27  Thus, the Supremacy Clause was introduced into the debate over the
new Constitution.28
The record fairly clearly shows that the founders wrote this clause with the inten-
tion that all international agreements properly entered into by the United States would
be binding as the supreme law of the land.29  Alexander Hamilton “asserted it to be a
fact that it was the sense and intention of the Constitutional Convention that a treaty
should control and bind the legislative powers of Congress.”30  In fact, the bulk of the
22 See Carlos M. Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L
L. 695, 698 (1995).
23 ROBERT T. DEVLIN, THE TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, at iii (1908). Indeed, this fact hindered American treaty negotiations during the time
period. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY: TREATY POWER VS. STATE POWER
62 (1913).
24 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 695–96
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (“It is notorious, that treaty stipulations . . . were grossly
disregarded by the states under the confederation. They were deemed by the states, not as laws,
but like requisitions, of mere moral obligation, and dependent upon the good will of the states
for their execution. . . . It was probably to obviate this very difficulty, that this clause was
inserted in the constitution . . . .”).
25 DEVLIN, supra note 23, at 6, 8.
26 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 1, at 98–99 (John Jay) (“The wisdom of the
Convention in committing such [treaty] questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts
appointed by, and responsible only to one National Government, cannot be too much com-
mended.”). This view was not universal, as demonstrated by the remarks and concerns of Patrick
Henry and George Mason at the Virginia Convention discussing the proposed federal con-
stitution. CRANDALL, supra note 14, at 58–59.
27 3 STORY, supra note 24, at 695.
28 Carlos M. Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1082, 1084 (1992) (“The inability of the general government under the Articles of Confederation
to secure compliance with the nation’s treaties, the acts of Congress, or the Articles themselves
was among the principal animating causes of the Framers’ decision to draft a new Constitution.”).
29 See Vázquez, supra note 22, at 700; see, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796)
(holding that the 1783 Treaty of Paris was the supreme law of the land and as such, debts owed
by Americans to British creditors could not be discharged by way of a Virginia statute because
the treaty explicitly stated that all such debts would be honored). But see Yoo, supra note 16,
at 1961.
30 JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT 144 (1999). Further, in Federalist No. 22, Hamilton wrote that “treaties of the
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debate over the treaty part of the clause focused not on whether treaties would be
considered the supreme law of the land, but rather upon how exactly they would be
ratified.31  John Jay, two-time President of the Continental Congress and the first Chief
Justice of the United States, “reported to Congress that a treaty ‘made, ratified and pub-
lished by Congress . . . immediately [became] binding on the whole nation, and super-
added to the laws of the land. . . . Hence [it was to be] . . . received and observed by
every member of the nation . . . .’”32  Congress unanimously adopted Jay’s report,
showing that they understood treaties to be immediate additions to federal law.33  The
founders intended international treaties to become federal law at the time they were rati-
fied by the Senate, and they intended their words to be taken literally,34 with no strings
or further interpretations attached.35  However, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Supremacy Clause over the past 175 years has led to an entirely different modern
reality of treaty interpretation and enforcement.36
C. Historical Divergence from Original Intent
Originally, the Court upheld the Framers’ intended purpose of the Supremacy
Clause by holding that treaties became part of the corpus of American law upon rati-
fication by the Senate.37  However, this precedent was set aside some fifty years after
the ratification of the Constitution with Chief Justice Marshall’s holding in the 1829
case of Foster v. Neilson.38  Foster considered ownership of land ceded by Spain to the
United States by treaty.39  The Court ruled that there were two distinct types of treaties:
United States . . . must be considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as
respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 1, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton).
31 See generally LYNCH, supra note 30, at 144 (discussing the debate about whether the
House of Representatives should be involved in the ratification of treaties instead of just the
Senate and Executive); EDWARD J. LARSON & MICHAEL P. WINSHIP, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION: A NARRATIVE HISTORY FROM THE NOTES OF JAMES MADISON 144 (2005) (dis-
cussing the same and adding that additional debate centered upon whether treaties of peace
should have different amendment requirements).
32 Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 760 (1988) (quoting
John Jay, Report to Congress, Oct. 13, 1786).
33 Id. at 760–61.
34 Vázquez, supra note 22, at 699 (“[T]he Founders sought to . . . mak[e] treaties enforceable
in the courts . . . without the need for additional legislative action, either state or federal.”).
35 Telman, supra note 8, at 414–16.
36 See id. at 409.
37 See Paust, supra note 32, at 765 (discussing early decisions of the Supreme Court, in-
cluding United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801), and Owings v.
Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344 (1809), in which Chief Justice Marshall opined that
treaties themselves were federal law so long as they were constitutional in their creation).
38 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
39 Id. at 299–300. The case involved a dispute over land in Florida where the plaintiff
claimed that the land had been granted to him by the Spanish governor, but the opposing
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those which became law upon their ratification, and those which “import a contract,
whe[re] either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses
itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the
contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”40
Under the doctrine created by Foster, those treaties which “address [themselves]
to the political . . . department[s]” require implementing legislation in order to become
the supreme law of the land.41  However, the distinction (and its associated test) was
inconsistently applied by the Court in the Nineteenth Century.42  The general trend, as
expressed by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, was to hold treaties to be
self-executing—that is, as the supreme law of the land—unless the treaty itself con-
tained language to the contrary.43  Therefore, though the Framers may not have intended
that implementing legislation ever be necessary for a treaty to address itself to the
courts, the rule at least held on to that intent by implementing a presumption in favor
of self-execution.44  Thus, treaties would self-execute unless the treaty expressly ad-
dressed itself to the “political department” and contained non-binding language.45  This
interpretation of Marshall’s distinction between self-executing and non-self-execut-
ing treaties was largely consistent with the Framers’ understanding of the Supremacy
Clause.46  Although the founders may not have anticipated a distinction between self-
executing and non self-executing treaties, even the most literal interpretation of the
Supremacy Clause would allow for treaties to declare themselves to be something
less than the supreme law of the land, just as Congress—the most common issuer of
“supreme laws of the land”—may issue non-binding legislation in the form of sense
of Congress declarations.47 Thus, some treaties, which could be primarily expressions
argument claimed that the land had been ceded from Spain to France and then from France to
the United States via treaty. Id.
40 John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of Treaties,
32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1209, 1210 (2009) (quoting Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314).
41 Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
42 See Paust, supra note 32, at 772.
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111(4) (1987) (defining a “non-self-
executing” international agreement); see also Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 545 (2008)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court has frequently held treaty provisions to
be self-executing).
44 Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
45 This is a point of contention among some scholars. For a brief discussion about whether
Foster and the subsequent case law created a presumption in favor of self-execution, see
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 160 (2004). The contention that Foster created a presumption in favor
of self-execution is favored by Justice Breyer’s dissent in Medellín, 552 U.S. at 545 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
46 Paust, supra note 32, at 768.
47 One or both houses of Congress may express its views about a subject in a “sense of”
resolution which is not binding as federal law. See CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., “SENSE OF” RESOLUTIONS AND PROVISIONS (2007); see also Yang v. Cal. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 183 F.3d 953, 958 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999).
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only of the general views and declarations of common understanding of nations would
purport themselves to be just that—non-binding statements.  Contrarily, in order for
a treaty to be considered a contract between nations enforceable by American courts as
domestic law, the treaty would have to contain some language which showed that the
negotiators did not contemplate the particular agreement as a non-binding political
understanding.
Until recently, this is where the history of judicial interpretation of the Supremacy
Clause would end—with a doctrine of interpretation different than, but consistent with,
the Framers’ intent.48  However, in 2008, more than 200 years after the Framers origi-
nally debated the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court saw fit to change the way in
which the clause is interpreted in American law by handing down its decision in
Medellín v. Texas, a holding which drastically reformed the landscape of treaty inter-
pretation and the Supremacy Clause in American law.
II. THE LENS OF MEDELLÍN V. TEXAS
A. Facts and Context of the Case
The facts of the case were undisputed.49  On the night of June 24, 1993, José
Ernesto Medellín was participating in a gang initiation ritual in Houston, Texas.50 
Jennifer Ertman and Elizabeth Pena, fourteen and sixteen years old respectively, were
walking home when they came upon the gang members.51  Medellín and the others
beat the girls, raped them, and finally murdered them. Medellín was personally respon-
sible for strangling at least one of them to death with her own shoelace.52  Medellín,
who confessed to the rape and murder apparently without remorse, was convicted of
capital murder and sentenced to death.53  The conviction and sentence held on appeal.54
Medellín, a Mexican national,55 was issued his Miranda rights upon his arrest, but
he was not informed of his right to contact the Mexican Consulate upon his detention.56 
He held this right according to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963,
to which the United States was a signatory.57  The Vienna Convention explicitly states
48 For an example of this analysis see Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and
Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2001). But see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 198–201 (2d ed. 1996).






55 Id. at 500.
56 Id. at 499.
57 Id. at 499–500; see Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.
77 [hereinafter Vienna Consular Convention]. The United States had signed and ratified the
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that individuals detained in a foreign nation have the right to contact the consulate of
their home country and that officials in the detaining nation must notify the national
of his rights under the Convention.58  Medellín raised the issue of the authorities’ failure
to notify him of his right to contact the Mexican consulate in an application for state
post-conviction relief and its subsequent appeals in Texas state courts.59  Medellín’s
habeas petition was denied in state court because of a state procedural default rule
which required that the issue of his Convention rights be raised during his trial or on
its direct appeal.60  The federal district court issued a similar ruling.61  Medellín’s appeal
was then given apparent new life by the decision of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals.62
In the Avena case, Mexico accused the United States before the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) of breaching its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations in fifty-two separate instances involving Mexican nationals.63  Medellín was
one of the individuals actually named in Mexico’s complaint.64  Mexico argued that the
specifically named individuals went uninformed of the rights that they held pursuant
to the Convention and thus that the United States had violated its obligations under the
treaty.65  The ICJ ruled in favor of Mexico, holding that the United States had failed to
fulfill its obligations under Article 36(1)(b) of the Convention,66 and that the nationals
named in Mexico’s complaint deserved “review and reconsideration of the[ir] convic-
tions and sentences . . . .”67  The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the Medellín case
Convention at the time the events of this case took place, but has since rescinded its consent
to be bound by the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to
the Convention. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 499–500 (citation omitted).
58 Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 57, 21 U.S.T. at 101.
59 See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501–02.
60 Id. at 501.
61 Id. at 502.  The Fifth Circuit then denied his certificate of appeal. Id. at 503.
62 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). But see
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 354–55 (2006) (stating that ICJ interpretations of
Vienna Convention disputes, such as Avena, are not binding on United States courts in regard
to the application of domestic procedural default rules to claimed Vienna Convention violations).
63 Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 24–26.
64 Id. at 25.
65 Id. at 20–21.
66 Id. at 71–72; see Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 57, 21 U.S.T. at 101 (“[T]he
competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of
the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed
to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also
be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph . . . .”).
67 Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 72. One of these fifty-two Mexican nationals, Ramón Salcido
Bojórquez, was not included in this holding. Id. at 53–54. This was because Salcido claimed
to be a United States citizen at the time of his arrest. Id. at 44.
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in order to decide the impact of the International Court of Justice’s Avena holding
on Medellín’s individual appeal.68  More broadly, the Court accepted certiorari to de-
cide the proper impact that decisions of the ICJ should have on state court procedures69
and on American courts in general.70  The ruling in Medellín answered these questions
and the much broader question of when, if ever, treaties become the “supreme law of
the land” without Congressional implementing legislation.
B. The Ruling
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion for the Court and was joined by
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito.71  The majority held that the ICJ decision
in Avena was not automatically enforceable domestic federal law, and would not
preempt Texas’s state laws of judicial procedure.72  Thus Texas was not required to
“review and reconsider[]” Medellín’s habeas petition on the basis of the Vienna
Convention provisions that he had failed to raise in his first appeals.73  The majority
further held that treaties at issue in this case74—Article 94 of the U.N. Charter and
the ICJ statute75—were not of the class of treaties that Chief Justice Marshall had so
68 The Court had already ruled on the issue of whether a state’s failure to abide by the
notification requirement of the Vienna Convention required the state to review the accused
person’s conviction when the issue had been procedurally defaulted. See Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006). The Court held that it could not force a state court to review the
petition. Id. at 357–58, 360.
69 Medellín was not the first case in which a state court was asked to determine the impact
of the Vienna Convention and related ICJ decisions on state rules of criminal procedure. See,
e.g., Bell v. Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 695, 705–07 (Va. 2002); State v. Cervantes-Carrillo,
No. 2005AP1408-CR, 2007 WL 968797 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2007).
70 The Court also addressed the issue of the impact of a presidential memorandum directed
at state courts to coerce them into fulfilling the United States’ treaty obligation. Medellín v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523–32 (2008). This issue is not directly addressed in this Note.
71 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 496.
72 Id. at 498. The Court admitted that the Avena ruling “constitutes an international law
obligation on the part of the United States,” but stated that “not all international law obliga-
tions automatically constitute binding federal law enforceable in United States courts,” and
held that the obligation created under the Avena ruling was not automatically binding federal
law. Id. at 504, 506.
73 Id. at 498. Upon Medellín’s loss in the Supreme Court, the State of Texas carried out his
death sentence by lethal injection. James C. McKinley, Jr., Texas Executes Mexican Despite
Objections from Bush and International Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at A19.
74 The Court deemed it unnecessary to decide whether the other treaty at issue in this case,
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, was self-executing. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506 n.4.
The Court did note that it had already ruled that the Vienna Convention did not override state
procedural rules in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. Id. at 512 n.8.
75 Under the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the
Vienna Convention, which the Senate had ratified, disputes between nations arising under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations were to be submitted to the ICJ, which would have
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long ago defined as self-executing.76  Thus, since the treaty had not been the subject
of implementing legislation in Congress, the ruling of the ICJ was not the supreme
law of the land.77
The majority rested their conclusions on the idea that the treaties upon which the
ICJ’s authority are based78 do not purport themselves to be self-executing,79 and so
therefore are not.80  The Court reached this conclusion by examining the language of
the treaty provisions.  It interpreted the language in the U.N. Charter Article 94(1),81
to mean that each state party could choose how to comply with the decision, and thus
that the decisions were not automatically binding upon the nation’s courts.82  The ma-
jority held that the “sensitive” policy considerations83 of whether or not to abide by the
decision of the ICJ should be left to the “political branches” of our government, namely,
the executive and the legislature.84  However, the Court further revealed that, though
a political branch under Marshall’s initial construction of the term, action undertaken
solely by the executive branch was insufficient to bind state courts.85  Thus President
Bush’s attempt to give force to the Avena decision by instructing the Texas state courts
to comply with the ICJ’s ruling were frustrated.86  According to the opinion then, a
compulsory jurisdiction over the parties. Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 57, 21
U.S.T. at 77, 326. Thus, Mexico’s Avena suit was rightly brought before the ICJ. The agree-
ment of member nations to be bound by decisions of the ICJ is in the U.N. Charter. U.N. Charter
art. 94, para. 1.
76 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 514 (citing Foster v. Neilson 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 253–54 (1829),
overruled in part by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833)).
77 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506.
78 See U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1; Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 57, 21
U.S.T. 77.
79 There is considerable room for questioning whether this is true, especially with regard
to the U.N. Charter. The language that the majority points to in order to substantiate the claim
that the Article does not purport itself to be self-executing is: “Each Member of the United
Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] . . . .” Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508
(quoting U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1). The dissent points to the same language and argues
that it does in fact contemplate itself to be self-executing. Id. at 553–54 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506 (majority opinion).
81 U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1 (“Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply
with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.”).
82 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508.
83 Id. at 511 (noting that the petitioner’s automatic enforceability theory would shift “sen-
sitive foreign policy decisions” to the courts and eliminate the “option of noncompliance con-
templated by Article 94(2)”).
84 Id. at 508.
85 The Court held that such a mandate was beyond the power of the Executive acting
alone, without Congressional assent. Id. at 525.
86 The Supreme Court issued a holding contrary to the Avena decision in Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon. Id. at 498. In response to this, President Bush issued a memorandum which stated
that the U.S. would fulfill its duties and obligations under Avena by having the states abide by
the Avena decision in their courts. Id.
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literal mandate from Congress (and nothing less) is necessary to make a treaty execute
unless the treaty contains specific self-execution language.87
The majority mentions the (naturally following) concern of the dissent “that our
decision casts doubt on some 70-odd treaties under which the United States has agreed
to submit disputes to the ICJ according to ‘roughly similar’ provisions.”88  The majority
then dismisses the dissent’s concern for these other treaties by saying that though a
treaty may fail to create a domestic law obligation through its language alone, it will
create an international law obligation, and can become domestic law if implemented
by Congress.89  This answer, however, misses the point of the dissent’s concern.  It is
at least probable that in some of the “70-odd treaties under . . . ‘roughly similar’ pro-
visions,”90 the intent of Executive and Senate was that the treaty become self-executing
and that decisions of the ICJ pursuant to such treaty were to become domestic law.91 
Just, of course, as it is likely that some of the treaties (including the dispute provision
at issue here, according to the majority) were not meant to self-execute.  However, the
majority rejects a case-by-case determination based on intent, in favor of a rule that the
language within the four corners of the document is dispositive.92  By treating the
87 Id. at 521 (“Congress is up to the task of implementing non-self-executing treaties . . . .
The judgments of a number of international tribunals enjoy a different status because of imple-
menting legislation enacted by Congress.”).
88 Id. at 520.
89 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 520. It is not entirely clear what threshold language a treaty must
contain in order to purport itself to be self-executing. At the least, according to the decision, it
must contain something stronger than the language in Article 94 of the U.N. Charter imple-
menting the ICJ as a dispute resolution mechanism: “undertakes to comply.” U.N. Charter
art. 94, para. 1. The Court did give two examples of language sufficient for self-execution.
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 521. The first was from an 1881 treaty between the United States and
Serbia. Id. (citing Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961)). The relevant treaty provision
states that “Serbian subjects in the United States . . . shall be at liberty to acquire and dispose
of [] property.” Kolovrat, 336 U.S. at 191 n.6. The language was binding upon an Oregon court
which had denied aliens within its jurisdiction of the rights contemplated in that treaty provision.
Id. at 191. Similarly, language in a 1923 treaty between the United States and Germany was
sufficient to bind a California court where the relevant treaty provision stated that “[w]here,
on the death of any person holding real or other immovable property . . . [a] national shall be
allowed a term of three years in which to sell the same, . . . and withdraw the proceeds thereof,
without restraint or interference . . . .” Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 507 (1947).
90 Id.
91 See Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM.
J. INT’L L. 540, 543–44 (2008) (discussing the role of legislative and executive intent in deter-
mining whether a treaty was self or non-self-executing). Exploration of the intent of the nego-
tiating parties to a treaty should be considered, not in the least because a treaty is fundamentally
a contract in which the intent of the parties is at least as important as the words that they commit
to paper. See Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 51 (1929) (citing Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S.
123 (1928)) (“Treaties are to be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent intention of the
parties.”); DRAHOZAL, supra note 45, at 160.
92 See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 517.
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“70-odd treaties”93 the same—and holding, crucially, that they are not self-executing—
the Court created a clear presumption against the self-execution of treaties.94
C. The Concurrence
Justice Stevens joined in the decision, but wrote a separate concurrence.95  Stevens
seemed stuck on the fence regarding the question of whether the Texas state court
should be forced to comply with the ICJ decision.  He fretted about the possible conse-
quences of ignoring the Avena decision but, in the end, did not find them compelling
enough to call the treaties self-executing.96  As the dissent pointed out, he ended up
furthest from the Framers’ intent.97  By asking the individual states to comply with the
Avena judgment,98 he essentially asked for a return to the days of the Articles of Con-
federation when the only hope for American compliance with its international obliga-
tions was based upon the good faith and effort of the individual states themselves.99  As
founder James Madison wrote in the Federalist No. 42, “If we are to be one nation in
any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.”100  Stevens recognized
this need to present a united front,101 but his method of doing so—asking states to
comply with the contracted international obligations of the United States by their own
choice—is not the most practical way of achieving this result.102  It was a solution
which has already been tried in this nation’s history, and which failed unequivocally.103
93 Id. at 520.
94 See Parry, supra note 7, at 69 (noting that the Court “strongly hints at” a presumption
against self-execution).
95 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 533 (Stevens, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 533–35, 537 (“On the other hand, the costs of refusing to respect the ICJ’s judgment
are significant. The entire Court and the President agree that breach will jeopardize the United
States’ plainly compelling interests in ensuring the reciprocal observance of the Vienna Con-
vention, protecting relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating commitment to the
role of international law.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
97 See id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The consequence of such a reading is to place the
fate of an international promise made by the United States in the hands of a single State. And that
is precisely the situation that the Framers sought to prevent by enacting the Supremacy Clause.”
(internal citation omitted)).
98 See id. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
99 Id. (“The consequences of such a reading is to place the fate of an international promise
made by the United States in the hands of a single State.”). For a discussion of treaties during the
Articles of Confederation, see supra text accompanying notes 21–27.
100 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 1, at 302 (James Madison).
101 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring).
102 Id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[The] purpose of [the] Supremacy Clause ‘was proba-
bly to obviate’ the ‘difficulty’ of a system where treaties were ‘dependant upon the good will
of the states for their execution.’” (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 696 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833))).
103 See Yoo, supra note 16, at 1980 (recounting the failure of the states to obey provisions
of the Treaty of Paris of 1783, which ended the Revolutionary War).
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D. The Dissent
Justice Breyer, was joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, in comprising the
dissent.104  The dissent used a historical approach to the Supremacy Clause and its sub-
sequent case law to argue that there is a strong presumption in the law in favor of self-
execution.105  The dissent cites language from the founders at the time of the framing
of the Constitution to argue that the Framers meant for the Supremacy Clause to confer
upon treaties direct enforceability in the courts of the nation.106  The dissent cites
several cases, and their precedent, from the history of treaty execution jurisprudence
that have upheld treaty provisions as binding American law.107  Most relevant to the
Medellín case were two cases (involving two different treaties) in which the Court had
held that where the United States had submitted to the jurisdiction of an international
tribunal, it was bound by the international court’s ruling.108
The dissent argued that “[t]he majority . . . looks for the wrong thing (explicit tex-
tual expression about self-execution) using the wrong standard (clarity) in the wrong
place (the treaty language)” to decide the question of self-execution in the case at bar.109 
According to Breyer, there are several substantive, contextual factors (derived from
case law which dealt with the issue of the self-execution of treaties) which should be
considered when deciding whether a treaty is self executing.110  These factors include:
(1) whether the language of the treaty points to self-execution;111 (2) whether the sub-
ject of the language deals precisely with matters that the courts are used to handling;112
(3) whether the treaty promise is itself self-executing;113 (4) whether the majority’s
holding has severe consequences for several other treaties;114 (5) whether the judiciary
(not Congress) is best able to implement this particular question of law;115 (6) whether
the judgment does not conflict with the Constitution or require the Court to create new
law;116 and (7) whether the President is in favor of (and Congress has not expressed
disagreement with) the enforcement of treaty provisions by and through the judiciary.117 
104 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 538 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 544–45.
106 Id. at 542–44.
107 Id. at 545.
108 Id. at 545–46 (citing Meade v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 691 (1870); Comegys
v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193 (1828)).
109 Id. at 562.
110 Id. at 551.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 555.
113 Id. at 556. The promise made explicitly in article 36(b)(1) to inform alien prisoners of
their right to contact their consulate. Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 67.
114 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 559 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 560.
116 Id. at 561.
117 Id. The majority rejected the idea that the president had the authority to order the state
courts to comply with the Avena decision. Id. at 532 (majority opinion). However, the dissent
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Though the dissent claims that its analysis for whether a treaty should be considered
self-executing is based simply on the language of the Supremacy Clause and prece-
dent,118 these seven issues roughly add up to a test based upon the fundamental sub-
stantive nature of the treaty and the rights which it has the potential to affect.119
Finally, the dissent attacks the textual interpretation espoused by the majority,
arguing that the words “undertakes to comply”120 in the U.N. Charter do not amount to
anything less than an obligation to understand the relevant ICJ decision as binding
domestic law.121  Breyer also takes issue with the textual analysis approach in general,
opining that because nations have varying models of domestic implementation for their
treaty commitments, it would be improper for an international agreement to explicitly
require certain steps for domestic implementation.122  The dissent applies its own method,
using the abovementioned seven factors to determine that the relevant treaty provisions
at issue in this case should be understood as self executing, and thus domestic law en-
forceable by American courts without implementing legislation from Congress.123
The dissent’s argument for the presumption of self-execution is a good one, rooted,
as discussed, in the clear expression of the Framers’ intent.124  It is also a contention that
is more directly supported by the historical case law on the subject,125 of which the
majority cannot have been unaware.126  But, what the dissent failed to recognize is that
seems much more willing to place such issues of treaty implementation and foreign policy
within the “zone of twilight” of permissible presidential power. Id. at 560–62 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant
or a denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution
is uncertain.”).
118 See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 562 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Were the Court . . . [to] look[]
instead to the Supremacy Clause and to the extensive case law . . . I believe it would reach a
better supported, more felicitous conclusion. That approach, well embedded in Court case law,
leads to the conclusion that the ICJ judgment before us is judicially enforceable without further
legislative action.”).
119 See id. at 549 (“In making this determination, this Court has found the provision’s subject
matter of particular importance.”).
120 U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.
121 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 553–54 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 552 (“[N]either the Protocol nor the Charter explicitly states that the obligation to
comply with an ICJ judgment automatically binds a party as a matter of domestic law without
further domestic legislation. But how could the language of those documents do otherwise? The
treaties are multilateral.”).
123 Id. at 562.
124 See Id. at 544–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
125 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829), overruled in part by United
States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833); Vázquez, supra note 22, at 708–09.
126 For a scathing review of the majority’s interpretation of the history of the Supremacy
Clause and relevant case law, see Telman, supra note 8, at 412.
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treaties themselves have changed since the time of the founding127 and Chief Justice
Marshall’s first basic distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties. 
While the dissent’s analysis follows a closer interpretation of the language and history
of the creation of the Supremacy Clause, its espousal of a continued presumption in
favor of the self-execution of treaties fails to account for the fact that modern treaties
have the increasing tendency to address issues, questions and rights which come close
to without actually contradicting our Constitution and federal law.  The grey areas of
Constitutional rights interpretation are those in danger of preemption by international
bodies,128 and it is these areas of law that the majority protects by establishing a pre-
sumption against self-execution.129  While the dissent’s contextual approach allows
the presumption in favor of self-execution to be disregarded when several other con-
textual factors indicate that the self-execution of a treaty might be inappropriate, the
majority’s holding, that implementing legislation is necessary in nearly all cases, will
provide more protection for the grey areas of American rights which could potentially
be affected by treaty provisions.
The Supreme Court did not address in Medellín whether the Vienna Convention
granted rights which could be enforced against the state by individuals,130 however the
Court held that the judgment of the ICJ in Avena was not one which could be enforced
by individuals.131  The Court relied on the international court’s charter statute which
asserts that the ICJ resolves disputes among nations—not individuals—to hold that
Medellín did not have an individual right to claim the Avena judgment as binding (even
though he was one of the named individuals in Mexico’s complaint).132  This argument
against such individually enforceable rights was also advanced by twenty-eight states,
the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico as amici curiae.133  The Court in Medellín de-
clined to decide whether the Vienna Convention gave an individually enforceable
right,134 though this was by no means the only way the issue could have been resolved. 
127 See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 18–19, 21, 28, 39 (1990) (discussing how dif-
ferent factors, such as broader interpretation of lack of remedies, may alter international effect).
128 No international obligation alone could ever overrule our Constitution, but there are issues,
questions and rights addressed by treaties which might come uncomfortably close to deciding
a question of law that feels like a constitutional question.
129 The majority could also be understood as protecting their turf as the ultimate arbiter of
American law as against inconsistent decisions by the ICJ. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
548 U.S. 331, 353–54 (2006). See generally Michael S. Paulson, The Constitutional Power To
Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1765 (2009) (describing how U.S. constitu-
tional law should be supreme to international law, and its interpretation should be conducted
by the United States).
130 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.4 (2008).
131 See id. at 506 (determining that legislation is needed for the treaty to be binding on
domestic courts).
132 Id. at 511.
133 Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Medellín, 552 U.S. 491 (No. 06-984).
134 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506 n.4.
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The states of the European Union, as amici curiae urged the Court to find that the
Vienna Convention confers individual rights which would be supreme over state pro-
cedural rules.135
Many treaties do not create individually enforceable rights because, by their nature,
treaties are contracts between nations which contemplate the rights and obligations
of states.136  But when it is clear that a treaty provision can be construed to create an
individually enforceable right, such right under a pre-Medellín standard would likely
be self-executing.137  Upon the Court’s new presumption that treaties are not self-
executing, if a right is to be given or taken away from the American people, the Court
has ensured that in the absence of explicit treaty language to the contrary (which is
not often found), by requiring implementing legislation, that the contemplated right
will come from (or be denied by) Congress or the state legislatures, not an interna-
tional agreement.
III. THE CHANGING NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
A. Nature of International Agreements
At the time of the framing of the Constitution, treaties dealt with war and peace,
land grants, alliances, and commercial relations.138  Some even granted limited rights
to individuals.139  Treaties did not deal with the fundamental rights of states, however,
or the citizens of those states.140  It was understood that treaties rightfully contracted
and signed would be binding upon the governments and people of the nations which
made the agreement.  After all, if they were not binding, nations would have had no
incentive to make agreements with one another.141  Nothing within the sphere of the
135 Brief for the European Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Medellín,
552 U.S. 491 (No. 06-984).
136 See Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (“A treaty is
primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its pro-
visions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail,
its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the
injured party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war.”).
137 See Yoo, supra note 16, at 1969 (“Foster declared that federal courts could enforce certain
treaty provisions particularly those that created individual rights . . . .” (citing Foster v. Neilson,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled in part by United States v. Percheman,  U.S. (7 Pet.)
32 (1833))).
138 See Lynch, supra note 30, at 150 (“[Treaties were] compact[s] with a foreign country
whereby each party could agree to arrangements for mutual security and mutual benefits,
including the exchange of commerce; to the adjudication of disputes, including the settlement
of boundaries; and, most important of all, during wartime, to the conclusion of peace.”).
139 See supra note 14.
140 See Bolstad, supra note 15, at 902.
141 See Vázquez, supra note 22, at 698 (noting the widespread problems with American
enforcement of treaties under the Articles of Confederation).
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Framers’ experience looked like many of the treaties, conventions, and agreements of
the modern day.142  As John Yoo wrote in a 1999 article on the subject, “International
agreements are becoming more like the permanent statutes and regulations that char-
acterize the domestic legal system, and less like mutually convenient, and temporary,
compacts to undertake state action.”143
Treaties today confer broad commercial rights to states and private parties, and
their scope reaches far beyond the trade, boundary and peace negotiations of the late
eighteenth century.144  While treaties have always considered trade provisions between
individual nations, bodies like the World Trade Organization and the North American
Free Trade Agreement go beyond initiating a reciprocal grant of Most Favored Nation
status145 and create duties for private individuals and obligations of states to interna-
tional tribunals.146  International agreements also contemplate the rights of states in re-
lation to the environment which all states share and impose burdens upon state actions,
which have the potential to impact the environment.147  This phenomena is new, perhaps
made possible only by the contemporary scientific understanding of the complexities
of the environment and the steps which must be taken to preserve it for our posterity. 
Nevertheless these treaties clearly constitute a class of state promises and obligations
which do not have analogies in treaties from the time of America’s founding.148
Perhaps the clearest example of treaties not contemplated at the time of the found-
ing are those that deal in human rights.  Author, and former president of the American
Society of International Law, Louis Henkin argues that “[t]he internationalization of
human rights, the transformation of the idea of constitutional rights in a few countries
to a universal conception and a staple of international politics and law, is a phenomenon
of the middle of [the twentieth] century.”149  This phenomenon of internationalization
of human rights has given rise to multilateral treaties which deal in issues once left exclu-
sively to the purview of sovereign nations.150  Agreements such as the International
142 There has been a boom in human rights treaties and the administration of international
criminal law against individuals in the post-World War II era. This reflects the trend toward
recognition of individual rights in international legal fora. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF
RIGHTS 16 (1990).
143 Yoo, supra note 16, at 1958.
144 See id. at 1968.
145 States entered into agreements for Most Favored Nation (MFN) status in the eighteenth
century, the time period of the drafting of the Constitution. The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and
Navigation (Jay Treaty) with Great Britain, for example, established MFN status between Great
Britain and the United States. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,
Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116; John J. Janssen, Dualist Constitutional Theory and the Republican
Revolution of 1800, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 381, 388 (1995).
146 Yoo, supra note 18, at 1968.
147 Id. at 1968–69.
148 Id. at 1967–68.
149 Henkin, supra note 142, at 13–14.
150 See, e.g., Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, U. N. TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim-
ination Against Women are examples of treaties that affect the fundamental rights of
people in the signer nations.151
In the United States, most of the human rights issues covered in treaties like these
are either guaranteed to citizens through the Bill of Rights and its subsequent interpreta-
tion by U.S. courts, or they are left to the people or to the individual States to legislate
upon appropriately through the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.152  The United States
has a well-established means for the provision and protection of the rights and civil
liberties found within these commercial, environmental and human rights treaties.  It
is understandable then, that a shift in the decision-making process regarding issues so
intricately tied to our understanding of, for example, the Bill of Rights, from the domes-
tic federal and state governments to diplomats negotiating treaties and the international
bodies charged with interpreting those treaties should give the Court pause.  The Court’s
ruling in Medellín, that there is a presumption against the self-execution of treaties,
reflects that pause as well as the desire to have only domestic law decide the fate of the
fundamental rights of Americans.  The ruling attempts to alleviate the “ambiguity and
contradictions in the status of treaties in the American legal system”153 by implying that
where there is doubt about the proper effect of a particular treaty upon American law
and upon American courts, the court will find that the language of the treaty supports
a theory of non-self-execution.
B. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
While many treaties potentially threaten the many and varied rights granted and
protected under the Constitution,154 an examination of the United Nations’ Convention
on the Rights of the Child155 and its potential effect on American law provides a prime
151 See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3. The ICCPR has been declared non-self-executing. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004) (holding that the United States ratified the Covenant on the express
understanding that it was not self-executing and therefore did not itself create obligations
enforceable in federal courts); see also Timothy K. Kuhner, Note, Human Rights Treaties In
U.S. Law: The Status Quo, its Underlying Bases, and Pathways for Change, 13 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 419, 425–26 (2003).
152 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
153 Yoo, supra note 16, at 1958 (discussing the unsettled nature of the treaty power under
the Constitution).
154 See supra note 117; see also Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General,
supra note 150.
155 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. Although the
Convention is a treaty in its own right and not decision of the ICJ like Avena, it is still a useful
example of the possible implications of self-execution. The Court has not yet discussed possible
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example of the friction between modern international treaty obligations and constitu-
tionally guaranteed individual rights.
The Convention is a binding legal instrument156 wherein party nations agree to
ensure that minors (children under the age of 18) in their countries are provided certain
basic human rights.157  This treaty is based upon the four principles of “non-discrimi-
nation; best interests of the child; the child’s right to life, survival and development; and
respect for the views of the child.”158  The Convention was presented on November 20,
1989, and has since been signed by representatives of every nation in the world, though
the United States and Somalia have failed to ratify it.159
There are several aspects of the Convention that have the potential to clash with the
rights—both positive and negative—guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the judicial
interpretation it has undergone in its over two-hundred years of existence.160  One of
the most-discussed provisions of the treaty could immediately change the reproductive
rights of American minors if the treaty were ratified and considered to be self-exe-
cuting.  Article 16 of the Convention reads: “(1) No child shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.  (2) The child has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”161  This can be interpreted
to mean that minors have the right to make reproductive decisions, including decisions
regarding abortion, without informing or receiving consent from their parents.162
While Roe v. Wade and subsequent decisions provided women in America with
the right to abort a pregnancy under certain circumstances,163 the Supreme Court has
self-execution or implementing legislation regarding the treaty because it has not been ratified
by the United States.
156 See Barbara J. Nauck, Note, Implications of the United States Ratification of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Civil Rights, the Constitution and the Family,
42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 675, 684 (1994) (“The wording is clear. The child is to be accorded these
rights without any action required on the part of the State Party.”).
157 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 155, at art 1–2.
158 United Nations Special Session on Children, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/special
session/rights/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
159 Somalia has evinced an intention to ratify the treaty. If it does, the United States will be
the only nation which has not ratified the Convention. Somalia to Join Child Rights Pact: UN,
REUTERS AFRICA, (Nov. 20, 2009, 1:19 PM), http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE5
AJ0IT20091120.
160 See Katie Hatziavramidis, Parental Involvement Laws for Abortion in the United States
and the United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child: Can International Law Secure
the Right to Choose for Minors?, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 185, 197 (2007) (“The freedom from
interference with privacy, which has been articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court as a consti-
tutional principle, would, under the convention, extend to minors seeking an abortion.”).
161 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 155, at art. 16.
162 Nauck, supra note 156, at 701–02 (noting that state parental notification laws may violate
the convention).
163 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992); Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 134 (1976), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 433 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned
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generally held state legislation164 that requires parents to be involved in the abortion
process of their minor children to be constitutional.165 Though the Court held in Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. United States that treaty language should be interpreted so as not to
invalidate state laws wherever possible,166 state laws giving parents the right to be
informed of their minor children’s reproductive decisions would not survive even the
most deferential reading of the Convention if its provisions were enforceable in Ameri-
can courts.  The rights guaranteed to children in Article 16 of the Convention are of the
highest class of rights incorporated by the treaty and, if enforceable in domestic courts,
are rights with the potential to upset established understandings of parental rights.167
The argument that the Convention would be self-executing is not supported by all
scholars, and indeed it runs against the general presumption that human rights treaties
are not, and were not under the pre-Medellín standard, self-executing.168  This pre-
sumption against the self-execution of human rights treaties, however, does not stem
from the language of the treaties or their provisions.  Rather, the presumption stems
from the Senate’s established practice of ratifying human rights treaties pursuant to
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); see also Roe, 410 U.S. 113 at 154. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485–86 (1965).
164 According to the Guttmacher Institute:
• 34 states require some parental involvement in a minor’s decision to
have an abortion.
• 20 states require parental consent only; 2 of which require both par-
ents to consent.
• 10 states require parental notification only; 1 of which requires that
both parents be notified.
• 4 states require both parental consent and notification.
• All of the 34 states that require parental involvement have an alter-
native process for minors seeking an abortion.
• 34 states include a judicial bypass procedure, which allows a minor
to obtain approval from a court.
• 6 states also permit a minor to obtain an abortion if a grandparent
or other adult relative is involved in the decision.
• Most states that require parental involvement make exceptions under
certain circumstances.
• 31 states permit a minor . . . an abortion in a medical emergency.
• 14 states permit a minor to obtain an abortion in cases of abuse,
assault, incest or neglect.
Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www
.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf. 
165 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1983) (“A
State’s interest in protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a consent statute,
either parental or judicial.”).
166 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 143 (1938).
167 See Hatziavramidis, supra note 160, at 194.
168 Kuhner, supra note 151, at 422.
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reservations, understandings and declarations which explicitly state the treaty will not
become self-executing and thus will not bind American courts.169  Setting aside these
reservations (as the Convention on the Rights of the Child has not yet been ratified,
reservations have not been contemplated by the Senate) and looking at the plain lan-
guage of the Convention, it appears at least some provisions are of the type the Court
has considered to be self-executing.  The Court has held, for example, that “all persons
who have real claims under a treaty should have their cause decided by national tribu-
nals.”170  Article 16 of the Convention specifically grants to children the protection of
law against interference in their privacy concerns.171  Such a clear grant of a liberty and
right to protection under the law could be construed, under the pre-Medellín analysis,
to afford children the “real claim under the treaty” that can be enforceable in court.172 
This runs directly counter to the judicial precedent on the matter which allows for par-
ental involvement in a minor’s choice to have an abortion.  It is also directly contrary
to the idea that American lawmakers and judges should decide the issues which affect
the rights of Americans.
According to the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Convention is a legally
binding instrument.173  Countries which sign and ratify it are bound, under interna-
tional law, to abide by all of its provisions.  The intent—that the treaty create enforce-
able legal obligations—was clear at the time of the signing.174  But after the ruling in
Medellín, were the Court to look at the Convention to decide whether it self-executes,
it would look first and foremost at the language in the document.  The Convention
states that nations will “respect and ensure the rights” and “take all appropriate mea-
sures” to see that the liberties in the Convention are granted to children in the state.175 
But how is this language substantively different than the language of the ICJ statute
which the court found lacking in Medellín? There, where the language stated that
nations would “undertake to comply,” the Court held that implementing legislation
was necessary to bind American courts.176  It would also likely find implementing legis-
lation necessary for the Convention on the Rights of the Child.177
169 See id. at 426 (“[The Senate] has declared all judicially relevant provisions of these
[human rights treaties to be] non-self-executing”).
170 Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cran.) 344, 348 (1809).
171 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 155, at art. 16.
172 See, e.g., Gerald Abraham, The Cry of the Children, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1345, 1365–66
n.126 (1996) (noting the Convention may be invoked in the domestic courts of at least sixteen
ratifying nations, including France and Australia).
173 Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/crc/ (last visited
Feb. 24, 2011).
174 Id. But see Abraham, supra note 172, at 1365–66 n.126 (noting that some states have
found the provisions of the treaty to have direct effect in their domestic courts).
175 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 155, at art. 2.
176 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008).
177 At this time, it does not matter whether the language of the treaty is clear enough to
support self-execution because the Senate has not ratified the treaty.
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IV. ORIGINAL INTENT IN MODERN TIMES
Many scholars consider American reluctance to ratify (or assent to the ratification
only pursuant to reservations which effectively strip the treaty of domestic legal effect)
human rights-based treaties as a sign of American exceptionalism; the willingness to
create rules for others but not be bound by them ourselves.178  However, perhaps the
problem is not so much that the United States is not committed to human rights, but
more that we believe that our Constitution, which is revered in American law and
history, should be interpreted and applied solely by Americans.  At least under a pre-
Medellín standard, upon ratification of a treaty like the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (without reservation), the United States would likely have been bound under
international law obligations to grant some of the rights as they appear in the treaty. 
This would come at the cost of invalidating various state laws already held to be con-
stitutionally consistent with the Bill of Rights.179  However, in a post-Medellín world,
the Senate may no longer need to tread so carefully upon the question of ratification
of a treaty.  Instead, it could signal to the international community that the United States
is committed to the principles of human rights treaties through ratification.  The Senate
could then consider and weigh the various domestic implications before providing
carefully crafted implementing legislation which would give a treaty, such as the Con-
vention, the force of law.  This may be the most desirable outcome, because though
it may seem that by making treaty ratification non-threatening, the Court has just put
the issue180 off until it is time for Congress to make implementing legislation, perhaps
this is a better, more proper way of proceeding under the principles of our Constitution. 
One of the Anti-Federalists’ greatest concerns about the treaty power as it was stated
in the Constitution during the debates on ratification was that the House of Repre-
sentatives did not have a say in the treaty ratification process.181  However, if a duly
ratified treaty must be addressed with the passage of implementing legislation, then
the House will have the opportunity to weigh in on these fundamentally rights-related
issues which are the fodder for modern day treaties, because though only the Senate
has the power to ratify a treaty, the Senate alone can not enact implementing legislation. 
Thus the “democracy gap”182 is cured by a ruling which presumes that treaties require
implementing legislation created by both houses of Congress before final law is created. 
The Medellín-created presumption against self-execution allows for democratic issu-
ance of law on the fundamental rights questions which are often raised by modern day
178 See, e.g., Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 389, 391 (2009) (“[T]his [is the] apparent paradox
of U.S. human rights policy—outwardly prodigious, inwardly niggardly . . . .”).
179 Nauck, supra note 156, at 701–02.
180 The issue of whether or how treaties signed by the United States will actually be imple-
mented as domestic law.
181 DRAHOZAL, supra note 45, at 158.
182 Yoo, supra note 16, at 1962.
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treaties, but which the Framers did not contemplate when they wrote that treaties would
be the “supreme law of the land.”183
The self-execution debate must also be considered in light of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.  Ninth Amendment concerns are triggered by the idea that rights can be
taken away from American citizens (such as the parental right to knowledge of a minor
child’s intent to obtain an abortion) without their voice or consent.184  And though such
a parental right is certainly not enumerated in the Constitution, the Ninth Amendment
and constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court has led scholars to believe that
such a right is reserved to the people.  The Court’s presumption in favor of non-self-
execution is consistent with protection of the unenumerated rights left to Americans
under the Ninth Amendment.  There are also Tenth Amendment concerns with ratifi-
cation because, as discussed, many modern treaties deal with issues once left solely to
domestic governments.185  In the United States, many of these rights are those granted
by individual state governments by and through their powers under the Tenth Amend-
ment.186  A greater discussion of the federalism concerns raised by this question is
beyond the scope of this Note.
Chief Justice Marshall preserved the original intent of the Framers, though it was
his decision in the Foster case that initially created a distinction among treaties as self-
executing and non-self-executing.187  And though his distinction has been transformed
into a presumption against the self-execution of treaties in Medellín, (which neither the
Founders nor Marshall would have predicted),188 the changed nature of international
agreements today allows Medellín to coexist with original intent instead of clashing
with it.189  The Founders spent considerable time and energy deciding exactly how
183 See Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Inter-
national Law, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 589, 590 (1995) (observing that Congress retains its supremacy
over domestic laws with the presumption against self-execution); see also Yoo, supra note 16,
at 1974–75.
184 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
185 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
186 Treaties may validly create or restrict rights ordinarily under the purview of the states
even if Congress would be precluded from passing the same legislation because of the Tenth
Amendment. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
187 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 254, 314 (1829), overruled in part by United States
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
188 Marshall reversed his decision from Foster in United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 51, a case regarding the exact same treaty which had been ruled upon in Foster. Pre-
sumably, this was because a more textually-accurate version of the treaty (in its original
Spanish language form) was made available to the Court which found the language of self-
execution it had not found in the translation used in the Foster case.
189 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523 (2008) (“Nothing in the text, background, nego-
tiating and drafting history, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the President
or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an international tribunal
a higher status than that enjoyed by ‘many of our most fundamental constitutional protections.’”
(quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006))).
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federal law was to be created in the United States according to their brilliant and deli-
cate system of checks and balances.  They did not envision a scenario in which domes-
tic law could be created by international bodies190 (particularly because no super-
sovereign bodies or courts existed at the time) pursuant to a treaty made the supreme
law of the land by the Supremacy Clause.  Accordingly, where treaties now have the
potential to impact the fundamental rights of Americans, Medellín’s presumption
against self-execution acts as a Congressional check on the potentially untoward
obligations imposed by modern international agreements.
V. EFFECTS
There is an uneasy push and pull between the idea that we do not want international
law or norms deciding how we interpret our Constitution191 and the historical precedent
of incorporating them anyway.192  Scholars and judges alike disagree on the subject. 
One scholar has suggested that we should actually look toward international law, par-
ticularly international humanitarian law, to interpret the rights granted to Americans
in our own Constitution, especially where the rights have not yet been enumerated by
Congress or the Constitution itself.193  Another argues that no international legal norms
or international bodies can ever aid in the interpretation of the Constitution.194  The lack
of consensus regarding the effect that international law should have on domestic law
is all the more reason why treaties today are—and rightfully should be—examined
substantively before they become the “supreme law of the land” and are imple-
mented through legislation from Congress.
Justice Scalia, a member of the majority in Medellín, disparages the use of inter-
national legal norms in furthering our understanding of our own Constitution.195  It is
190 Id. at 515. (“Our Framers established a careful set of procedures that must be followed
before federal law can be created under the Constitution—vesting that decision in the political
branches, subject to checks and balances. They also recognized that treaties could create federal
law, but again through the political branches, with the President making the treaty and the Senate
approving it.” (citing U.S. CONST. art I, §7; id. art II, §2)).
191 See Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305, 307 (2004) (“It is my view that modern foreign legal materials
can never be relevant to an interpretation of—to the meaning of—the U.S. Constitution.”).
192 Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 7–8 (2006). But
see Paulson, supra note 129, at 1765–66 (“The power to interpret and apply international law
for the United States is a power vested in . . . the U.S. government, not in any foreign or inter-
national body. . . . As a matter of U.S. constitutional law, the International Court of Justice . . .
cannot authoritatively determine the content of international law for the United States.”).
193 Cindy G. Buys, Burying our Constitution in the Sand? Evaluating the Ostrich
Response to the Use of International and Foreign Law in U.S. Constitutional Interpretation,
21 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 2, 30 (2007).
194 Paulson, supra note 129, at 1765–66.
195 Scalia, supra note 191, at 307.
854 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:829
not a stretch to view the Court’s recent decision in Medellín as a sort of protectionist
way of reclaiming the unqualified right to say what the law is.196  This hesitancy may
indeed have been what the Framers would have intended could they have known about
the nature of modern treaties and the way that they have the potential to impact
individual rights.197  However, there may be serious consequences to this way of
thinking for American foreign policy which the majority in Medellín seemed to not
even consider.
The United States’ refusal to ratify treaties can create problems on the interna-
tional stage.198  The world looks to the United States as a leader in democracy and the
provision of rights.  Even when the United States does ratify treaties such as the Vienna
Convention, issues arise with our neighbors and international partners when the United
States does not follow the letter of the treaty (or what the international community
perceives to be the letter of the treaty), or when the United States makes reservations
preserving the status quo in American law.199  Unfortunately, these problems are not
likely to be solved with the ruling in Medellín that treaties require implementing legis-
lation to be executed.  If anything, this requirement makes the legitimacy of the United
States’ multilateral rights treaties an even thornier issue, if for no other reason than that
Congress will likely be slow to implement legislation to give effect to treaties which
should be binding on American courts.200  Similarly, the United States’ apparent lack-
luster commitment to human rights treaties, even those it does ratify, could give rise
to problems for American nationals abroad.201  If other nations cannot trust that their
nationals will be afforded the protections given to them by law under the Vienna Con-
vention and other treaties which deal with the rights of foreign nationals, they may
choose to reciprocally deprive American nationals of their rights.202  Though serious,
196 This proposition is further backed by the fact that the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas,
two years prior to Medellín  ruled on the same question that faced the ICJ in Avena, and came
out on the other side of the issue. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 354–55 (2006).
197 One author suggests that the use of foreign or international law norms is a trend in which
“beginning in the late nineteen-nineties, the Court’s more liberal members began citing foreign
sources to help interpret the Constitution on basic questions of individual liberties.” Jeffrey
Toobin, Swing Shift, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42.
198 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 537 (2008) (Stevens, J. concurring) (“On the other
hand, the costs of refusing to respect the ICJ’s judgment are significant.”); id. at 566 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“[This ruling threatens to] diminish[] our Nation’s reputation abroad as a result
of our failure to follow the ‘rule of law’ principles that we preach.”).
199 See Brief for the European Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 135 at  2–3; Brief for the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 4–5, Medellín, 552 U.S. 491 (No. 06-984). Both parties argued for the Court to stringently
apply the liberal interpretation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention as well as affirm the
ICJ’s opinion in Avena.
200 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 560 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 566.
202 Id.
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these consequences should not be considered to tip the balance in favor of a presump-
tion of self-execution.
CONCLUSION
The Framers intended nothing if not that the Constitution be a living document,
capable of absorbing the realities of ever-changing times.  We are in an era where
treaties are substantively different than they were at the time of the founding, and it
is necessary that we interpret Constitutional provisions (made with one type of treaty
in mind) in a way that will reflect the ideals and principles upon which our Constitution
and our nation are based.  The majority in Medellín cast off the originalist and historical
interpretations of the Supremacy Clause in their opinion by discarding the well-estab-
lished precedent for the presumption of self-execution in U.S. treaties and international
agreements.  However, their decision is ultimately consistent with the Framers’ actual
intent and understanding of the Constitution because the substantive nature of treaties
has so changed in the past 200 years that to follow history and precedent would in itself
be diverging from original intent.
